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Introduction 
Philosophy: what is the point? This question is particularly pertinent to those of us who 
are engaged in the uphill battle of attempting to bring philosophy to all of the world’s citizens—
children and adults alike. Most often, this question is answered by referring to the potential for 
increasing reasoning power and expanding cognitive perspectives. Enhancing the capacity for 
empathy is frequently mentioned as well. Here, we focus on a different potential, namely the 
potential for solidifying a worthy personal goal. More specifically, we argue that it is imperative 
that we, who are philosophical educators, have a vision of the goal: “In the service of what do we 
want to expand thinking power?”   
Elsewhere, Gardner (2009), a co-author of this article, has argued that the only 
responsible way to sell the merits of improving thinking skills is to show how, as a result, 
individuals gain the capacity to become more autonomous, or “free,” in the sense of becoming 
more self-legislating. However, this assertion, if taken superficially, can be misleading. On the 
one hand, “becoming more free” can be “over-Kantianized” in the sense of being interpreted as 
enhancing one’s capacity for solitary rational thinking free from the input of others. On the other 
hand, “becoming more free” can be “under-Kantianized” in the sense of being interpreted as 
either mere license, or the capacity to manipulate others to one’s will, i.e., unhinged, or free, from 
any standards of rationality altogether, i.e., free to do whatever one wants to do.1  
In this paper, we attempt to stabilize the notion of autonomy by marrying Kant’s notion of 
“solitary thinking” to a more Habermasian notion of “thinking through dialogue,” and then 
weaving this dialogical perspective into an Existential structure, upheld, in part, by references to 
Charles Taylor, to psychiatrist R.D. Laing and to neuroscientist Daniel Siegel. As a result of these 
deliberations, we argue that we ought to overtly counsel our charges of the merits of 
authenticity, and, thereafter, to develop educational strategies so that we nudge one another 
toward that goal.  Paradoxically, we claim that learning to become authentic—learning to become 
one’s own person—can only be done through interpersonal dialogue, and that educational 
strategies that focus on enhancing the right kind of “authenticity-producing interchange,” along 
with those that enhance reasoning skills, are the sort that we ought to be gifting to our children.  
In other words, that though authenticity must be grasped/created/embodied from the inside, 
authenticity can nonetheless be incubated in an environment in which its pursuit as a genuine 
possibility is made evident, in which its value is made paramount, and in which individuals 
become entangled in matrices of interpersonal reasoned interaction that are both engaged and 
objective.  
What are the Criteria for Authenticity?   
We suggest, at a minimum, the following five criteria for an “authenticized” notion of 
autonomy.   
1) An authentic person must recognize that persons are not objects. 
In ordinary everyday life, the notion of authenticity is most typically used in conjunction 
with objects, e.g., “this is an authentic diamond.”  When persons begin to think of authenticity in 
this vein, they may come to believe that just as an authentic diamond must be the same through-
and through, so a sufficient condition for authenticity is being the same through-and-through; 
that they are authentic if their “outside” matches their “inside.” For example, hitting Frankie, 
then, could be described as an authentic act because I really wanted to hit Frankie.  In a similar 
vein, authenticity might be perceived as a function of some long-term characteristic, e.g., I am 
authentic when I am angry because I have always had a bad temper. So, whatever else an 
authentic person must recognize, s/he must recognize that the predicate “authentic” changes its 
meaning entirely when applied to persons rather than objects—which brings us to the next 4 
more positive points.  
2) An authentic person must see herself as a future-oriented self-propelling process.  
Persons, because they are self-conscious language-users and have the capacity to imagine 
themselves in the future and hence can direct their present behaviour accordingly, are best 
described as “future-oriented processes.” The descriptive “authenticity,” then, must capture the 
fact that no static description can accurately characterize who I am, let alone justify any of my 
actions.  Authentic persons, thus, can only accurately describe themselves in the present by 
reference to who it is that they are choosing to become. An authentic self-description is thus, in a 
sense, a promissory note that stands in relation to a person’s ideals or values. Hence, the only 
means of evaluating the authenticity of persons is to ask them questions that will elucidate 
whether there is a discrepancy between their ideal and their current actions, i.e., whether their 
present actions align with the life project they are proposing. In “existential analytic” terms, this 
would be referred to as “inner consent” (Klaassen 2014), i.e., that one quite literally asks oneself 
whether one consents to do what one is doing or about to do.  
3) An authentic person must recognize that s/he is always responsible for what s/he 
does—a responsibility that becomes evident by a reasoned reference to a temporal 
dimension.  
Let’s look at the following examples: “I did x because he made me do it. I did x because 
everyone else is doing x. I did x because I had no choice.” Note that the reasoning offered in 
these examples deflects responsibility away from the self; it is the kind of reasoning that suggests 
a sort of bystander attitude towards one’s own life. By contrast, the reasoning required to signal 
genuine responsibility must show that, though the actor may have had little control over the 
circumstance in which s/he found herself, s/he nonetheless had a choice as to how to respond, 
and her justification for how she responded must show how s/he believes the course of action 
chosen contributes to the person s/he hopes to become. Authenticity, in other words, requires that 
we hold one another personally accountable in the sense of seeking justification relative to a 
future vision, albeit also relative to circumstance and personal context.  Who is it that you are 
consenting to become by doing what you did?  
4) An authentic person must recognize that s/he can self-create only relative to given 
circumstances and personal context.  
Self-creation is always relative to the circumstance and personal context; a point 
emphatically stressed by Viktor Frankl in his book, Man’s Search for Meaning (1984).  Though 
this point may seem obvious, failure to recognize “freedom’s context” can, quite literally, be 
counterproductive. This is so because, for instance, if students are enthusiastically encouraged to 
self-create a priori2 and then, subsequently, they find their plans and expectations thwarted 
(perhaps utterly), such a failure in expectations and aspirations can decimate the plausibility of 
self-creation, and reinforce the notion that they are merely victims of circumstance—i.e., objects 
damaged by life.  
5) An authentic person must recognize that s/he can self-create only in relation to 
objective descriptives that must be justified in interpersonal space.   
The possibility of authentic self-creation is also endangered if the limited degree of 
control that anyone has over the description of what they do, and consequently, who they are, is 
also not emphasized. Such, indeed, is the danger of self-help books that market the solipsistic, 
arrogant notion of the power of positive thinking: “As long as I believe that I am worthy of 
esteem, I will have self-esteem.”  Authorship over self-descriptives (or evaluative predicates) is 
not and cannot be a private affair, any more than a private language is possible, as Wittgenstein 
(1968) was at such pains to point out some time ago. Evaluative predicates don’t stick just 
because someone says so. Evaluative predicates stick with the glue of reason. Evaluative 
predicates stick because they are backed by the “least weak” (Gardner, 2009) of the reasoned 
arguments that support competing alternatives. This leads us to the following conclusion: Who 
you are, and the degree to which you have power over who it is that you are becoming, is not 
only a function of what you do, but, as well, your ability to reason through to the best description 
of what you do—hopefully, before you do it. And reasoning, as argued below, is, at its core, an 
“inter-” rather than an “intra-”subjective process.  
Authenticity-Enhancing Education 
With a description of authenticity in hand—that authenticity requires that we view 
ourselves as forward-oriented processes actively responsible for responding to ever-changing 
circumstances which, in turn, will attract descriptives that, if objective, will call for ownership—
we are now in a position to outline the sort of educational strategies that might enhance its 
possibility. Given the above, we articulate three principles.  First and foremost, the whole notion 
of authenticity, and its worth, must be explicated explicitly, i.e., in order to move toward the goal, 
we need to know what the goal looks like.  Second, we argue that becoming alert to the power of 
one’s own self-creation can only happen within interpersonal space, and that we need to create 
dialogical opportunities in which participants become more skilled in the kind of “interpersonal 
language of freedom” that is necessary to nurture authenticity, including communicative 
interchanges that are (i) contingent, (ii) threaded with “liberation-enhancing questions,” and (iii) 
“process” rather than “object” oriented.  Third, we argue that we need to insist on developing the 
sort of reasoning skills that are necessary to recognize when reason’s ‘glue’ is or will be (or is not 
or will not be) strong enough to keep evaluative predicates in place.  We will address these points 
in turn.  
1) Explicating the goal.  
In his book The Ethics of Authenticity (2003), originally part of the CBC’s 1991 Massey 
lecture series entitled The Malaise of Modernity, Charles Taylor argued that the modern emphasis 
on self-fulfillment that appears to underwrite the current trend toward relativism, nihilism, and 
the lack of civic participation, does not deserve the cynical interpretation of a mere back-sliding 
into biologically-based selfish egoism, as suggested, for instance, in Allan Bloom’s The Closing 
of the American Mind (1987). He argued, rather (and perhaps surprisingly), that this apparent 
epidemic of narcissism is actually a misplaced reaching for an extremely high ideal, namely 
“authenticity.” Like over-confident trapeze artists, we are reaching for the highest bar, but due to 
the drag of serious conceptual confusion, we are falling short, and, in so doing, potentially 
tumbling toward our demise. In other words, it is precisely because we are trying to be authentic, 
but are confused with regard to what authenticity looks like, that we are moving away from, 
rather than toward, the goal.  
In supporting this claim, Taylor (2003) explored the emergent roots of the call to 
authenticity through Rousseau, Locke, Nietzsche, and others, and argued that, unlike earlier 
societies in which a person’s identity was largely fixed by his or her social position, we are 
required, whether we like it or not, to negotiate our identities with others; a negotiation that, 
importantly, can succeed or fail. He vehemently criticizes those who deem themselves authentic 
solely as a function of “self-choice”; it is simply unintelligible, he argues, for me to believe that I 
could just decide that what is significant or admirable about my life is wiggling my toes in warm 
mud (p 36). We all, according to Taylor, must make claims with regard to our identity—what we 
are referring to here as “evaluative predicates”—against what he refers to as “horizons of 
significance” (p. 37). 
What Taylor is arguing is that both the “knockers” of society who despair of the new 
unfettered selfishness, and the “boosters” who celebrate this narcissism as a new form of self-
fulfillment (p. 72) are blind to the pervasive never-ending and absolutely necessary modern 
struggle of self-creation. According to Taylor, we ought not to be knocking one another for being 
so self-centered, nor ought we to simply relax in a celebration of the modern era’s materialistic 
overabundance. What we are called to do, rather, in order to combat the Malaise of Modernity 
and all the psychological, sociological, and political problems that it brings, is first to see that the 
struggle for an authentic self-identity is the challenge of the age, and that we must all get 
involved in formulating a far more precise and hence demanding notion of what that ideal indeed 
requires of us (p. 72).  Such a description is precisely what is being offered here.  
However, once such a description is in hand, it behooves us to go further and articulate, at 
least in broad strokes, what sort of educational strategies ought to be employed so that 
authenticity’s possibility can move toward actuality. Since self-creation, whether authentic or 
not, happens only through interpersonal dialogue (Mead,1965; Taylor, 2003), what is needed is a 
more precise analysis of what kind of interpersonal dialogue propels us toward, or away from, the 
goal we seek. We will refer to the kind of dialogue that enhances authenticity as the “language of 
freedom.”  
2) Creating Specific Dialogical Opportunities that Offer an Immersion in the 
“Language of Freedom” 
In making the argument that the self only emerges through dialogue, Mead, most 
famously known for his insistence that interpersonal dialogue is a necessary condition for the 
emergence of self-consciousness per se (1965), has become, to many who promote a dialogical 
form of education, a standard bearer. Thus, those of us in the Philosophy for Children movement 
have often assumed that the Community of Inquiry is a likely candidate for being heralded as a 
significant educational strategy for priming the pump of self-creation. However, as we argue 
here, such accolades need to be kept at bay until a more precise account of the kind of dialogue 
that is necessary for self-creation that is authentic is analyzed more fully. If it is the case that in 
order to reach toward authenticity, self-creating communicative interchange needs to be 
“contingent,” threaded through with “liberating questions,” and “process,” rather than “object” 
oriented, then it would seem to follow that facilitators of Communities of Inquiry must be far 
more actively and genuinely “engaged” than has hitherto been recognized. If, as may be 
common, the facilitator tries, as it were, to disappear so as not to steal the participants’ thunder, if 
s/he acts almost entirely like a gate keeper, if the facilitator depends too much on dynamics of the 
community itself to move towards truth (a strategy often promoted in calls for dialogic as 
opposed to monologic pedagogical approaches (Reznitskaya, 2012), too many contributions will 
pass into the mix unconfirmed, too many opportunities for agent-recognition will be missed, and 
too much object-referencing will go uncorrected.  We describe each of the subcategories on the 
language of freedom mentioned above in turn.  
(i) “Contingent” communication.  
R.D. Laing (1969) argued that how we communicate with one another can either have a 
confirming or disconfirming impact on one another’s identity, i.e., it can help or stultify the 
process of self-creation. To illustrate his point, he used the example of a 5-year old boy running 
to his mother saying “Mummy, look what a big worm I have got” (p. 102).  The mother responds 
in a disconfirming or stultifying way in saying, “You are filthy—away and clean yourself 
immediately.” 
What is important to note about this example is that Laing is not faulting the mother for 
not showing delight in being presented with a worm.  Laing, rather, is faulting the mother for not 
seeing the boy by acknowledging the boy’s agency. Specifically, Laing says of the mother that 
she fails “to endorse what the boy is doing from his point of view, namely showing his mummy a 
worm” (p. 103). Instead of using such “tangential” responses, Laing argues that we ought instead 
to use confirmatory responses.  He describes a confirmatory response as a direct response; it is 
“to the point,” or “on the same wavelength as the initiatory or evocatory action” (p. 99).  Laing 
stresses that a confirmatory response need not (importantly) be in agreement, or gratifying, or 
satisfying. Rejection can be confirmatory if it is direct, not tangential, and recognizes the evoking 
action and grants it significance and validity. 
What Laing referred to as a “confirmatory response,” Daniel Siegel, writing from the 
point of "Interpersonal Neurobiology (IPNB)," i.e., a field that studies how interpersonal 
interaction affects the structure of the brain, refers to as “contingent responses.” In his book The 
Developing Mind (2012), Siegel argued that interpersonal communicative interaction—both early 
in life and throughout adulthood—play a central role in shaping the brain and, along with it, the 
ever-emerging mind. Siegel stressed that what is important in shaping our identities is not just 
that we are involved in relationships per se, nor that we engage in interpersonal communication 
per se. What is important is that we are involved in contingent communication (p. 34) by which 
he means that we respond to one another in a way that suggests that the other is seen as having an 
internal centre of subjective life worthy of attention (p. 105); that, in communicating with the 
other, we are attempting to see the other’s minds—what Siegel refers to as “mind-sight” (p. 34). 
An integrated sense of self, or what Laing (1972) would refer to as a self “undivided,” requires, 
according to Siegel, integrative communication, i.e., communication that integrates us with one 
another, which, in turn, allows integrative neurophysiological changes to occur throughout life.  
If the above carries insight, then it seems to follow that if a facilitator of a community of 
inquiry, or indeed anyone in any kind of interpersonal interchange, does not feel that s/he has 
either practical or theoretical permission to respond contingently to offerings by members of the 
community, tangential responses may well become the norm. Contributions by participants will 
just fall into the mix, and frequently, perhaps more often than not, be unrecognized. For reasons 
already mentioned, such “opinion tourism” will do more harm than good when it comes to its 
potential for enhancing authentic self-creation.   
(ii) “Liberating Questions.”  
Gardner (1996) recommended to those who facilitate Communities of Inquiry to be alert 
to the possibility of asking a “second why,” so that if, for example, the teacher asks Johnny why 
he hit Frankie, and Johnny responds that he hit Frankie because Frankie hit him, the teacher 
needs to ask again, but why did you think that hitting Frankie in response to him hitting you was 
a good idea? This is exactly the sort of language—this is exactly the sort of question—that gives 
birth to the kind of justificatory reflection that focuses on self-creation.  
In Truth and Method (2004), Gadamer wrote at length about the importance of asking just 
the right sort of question in just the right kind of way. He says, for instance, that in order to be 
able to genuinely ask, one must want to know, and that means knowing that one does not know 
(p. 157); that “the art of questioning, is the art of questioning ever further—i.e., the art of 
thinking” (p. 160). 
Saying that “genuine questioning requires that one must want to know,” in turn, gives rise 
to the provocative question of what precisely, in this instance, the teacher, in questioning Johnny 
why he thought that hitting Frankie in response to Frankie hitting him was a good idea, wants to 
know.  The only answer that seems to fit here is that the teacher wants to know who it is that 
Johnny is trying to become; that the teacher wants to know Johnny as a person.  
If this is true, then again, facilitators of Communities of Inquiry, or again anyone engaged 
in any interpersonal interchange, needs to become far more engaged than has hitherto been 
recognized; we need to follow up contributions with the kind of liberating questions that begins 
to lay bare the unique perspectives of others as the unique individuals they are becoming.  
(iii)  “Process-” versus “Object”-language.   
 “The window broke because it was hit by a stone.” “The dog barked because it heard a 
noise in the backyard.” “I hit Frankie because he hit me.” What do these three claims have in 
common?  What these statements have in common is the underlying assumption that the event 
cited in the reason explains the event cited in the conclusion.  This language of explanation, in 
turn, is one that makes sense only on the assumption that there is a stable causal deterministic 
nexus such that, with foresight, the event cited in the conclusion could have been predicted. The 
use of the language of explanation, in other words, suggests that the speaker views him/herself 
more as a product of external forces, than as a person in charge of her own destiny.  
This viewpoint contrasts sharply with the language of justification, e.g., “I hit him 
because I wanted to send the message that I refuse to be a victim of his bullying.” This language 
suggests that the speaker believes that he is required to account for his decisions: that he must 
answer for, and hence is assumed to have had control over his actions, as opposed to explaining 
that he is this kind of object that has these kinds of definitive properties that are outside of his 
control.  
If one is not lucky enough to be in a highly benevolent environment, then viewing oneself 
as an object like other objects can do double damage. Not only can it extinguish the exhilaration 
that comes with a robust sense of self-determination, it can solidify injuries into stable predicates.  
Thus, for instance, if Johnny views himself as he views other ordinary objects, it follows that he 
believes that, if he is subjected to harsh destructive external forces, like other objects, he can 
rightly view himself as damaged goods.  What is missing in such a situation—what in fact can be 
redeemed through the language of freedom, is Johnny’s recognition that whether or not Johnny 
as a person is indeed damaged goods, is entirely within Johnny’s hands. What is missing here is 
that Johnny does not understand that he is being called into account; that regardless of external 
stimuli, Johnny is nonetheless responsible for the evaluative predicates that stick to him as a 
result of actions that are within his control. And what is missing here, perhaps, most importantly 
is the potential mitigating impact that a future vision can have on present predicates.  
Thus, for Johnny to motivationally engage in this process of authentic self-creation, he 
must first become awake to, and thereafter, constantly vigilant to, its possibility.  And this is 
where the language of freedom comes in. What we are proposing here is that the language we 
use, and/or allow, in dialogue with one another can either enhance a sense of responsibility and 
hence activate the goal of autonomy and authenticity, or it can solidify a sense of being a victim 
of circumstance. What needs to happen in interpersonal interchange, whether one-on-one or in 
community, is that a description of an event that is offered as an explanation ought to be rejected 
as inappropriate for persons, and there should follow an insistence that, instead, a justification in 
terms of motives be offered.  
3) Becoming “Tinker-Thinkers.”  
Like the notions of “freedom” and “authenticity,” the conceptual confusions that surround 
the notions of what counts as “thinking” and/or “reasoning” have disastrous consequences. 
Many, perhaps most, people assume that they are reasoning if they offer a reason—any old 
reason—after first promulgating a conclusion that they intuitively believe and/or want to be true. 
Since they believe that they, and their positions, are “reasonable,” they squelch utterly any 
inclination either to doubt their own position or seriously contemplate the merits of opposing 
views.  
Following Gardner (2014), this can be described as a “pathological” state. She argued 
strenuously that we must work hard to sell the “reason game,” i.e., that we owe it to our children 
that they learn that what counts as reasoning is not up to them.  That reasoning, rather, is 
something that is governed by objective norms (Darwell, 2006); and that it must transpire in 
public space so that the worth of all truth-contenders can be estimated by their ability to survive 
counterexample and alternative comparison.  This approach, outlined in detail by Gardner 
(2009), echoes the theoretical framework offered by Jurgen Habermas in his book The Theory of 
Communicative Action (1992).  
Since then, with colleague Amy Leask, Gardner has worked to create an app and kid’s 
book that invites youngsters to become “Tinker Thinkers” (2014). This initiative aims to teach 
children: (1) that they can’t tell whether or not an act is good or bad until they know the reason 
behind it: i.e., learn the importance of asking “why?”; (2) that they must see the silent reason that 
always comes attached with the stated reason; and, thereafter (3) that they can separate good 
from bad reasons by subjecting them to counterexamples; (4) and, in so doing, become 
convinced, as a result, that what counts as a good reason is not up to them.  This kind of 
knowledge of specific logical moves, along with “facilitated” exposure to opposing viewpoints—
as happens in Communities of Inquiry—will equip youngsters with highly effective skills to 
genuinely reason their way toward truth.     
With regard to authenticity, the payoff for being able to reason well is multifaceted. On 
the one hand, learning how to reason creates a habit of reasoning before acting, speaking and 
judging, and it is this preamble that, more than anything, will hook into the sense of self-
determination. Secondly, the security with which evaluative judgments are structured into one’s 
identity will be enhanced as a function of the strength of the reasons that back them. Third, since 
one comes to appreciate that reasoning is a function of objective rules, if faced with otherwise 
persuasive pressure from peers, one can appeal to an internal “Kingdom of Ends” for guidance. 
And finally, since one knows that the strength of any reason is a function of the degree to which 
it can withstand both counterexample and alternative options, one (hopefully) will be more prone 
to stay open to opposing views, in the knowledge that such an attitude contributes to stability of 
one’s very self.  
Conclusion 
So the take-home message from all the above is that whether we like it or not, we are all in the 
business of self-creation that can either succeed or fail as function of the degree to which it 
approaches authenticity. If authenticity is the goal, then what an authentic self actually looks like 
needs to become common currency. And since a specific kind of dialogue, one we have referred 
to as the “language of freedom” seems necessary for authentic self-creation, this is the sort of 
language that we all ought to adopt whether in personal or pedagogical interaction. And finally, 
since the stability of self-definition is a function of the reasoning that transpires before judging, 
speaking and acting, and since evaluative self-predicates are only kept in place by reason’s glue, 
then learning how to reason ought to be considered a human right.   
Taylor (2003) argued that since authenticity is so important, i.e., “it allows us to live (potentially) 
a fuller and more differentiated life because more fully appropriated as our own” (p.74), and 
since conceptual confusion can send us in the opposite direction, what we ought to be doing is 
fighting over the meaning of authenticity. This, along with suggestions as to how to enhance 
authenticity in our everyday world, as well as in the classroom, has been the goal of the present 
enterprise.  
 
                                                          
1 This worry, interestingly, echoes that of Hegel’s that he outlines in The Elements of the Philosophy of Right, and 
discussed in detail by Axel Honneth in his book The Pathologies of Individual Freedom; Hegel’s Social Theory. 
(2010) Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 45. 
2 As might happen in a classroom exercise in which students are encouraged to imagine what kind of people they 
“authentically” want to become.  
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